Double
Narratives of Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards Middle East:
The Quest of
Balancing Interests and Ethics
By Mehdi
ZOUAOUI*
Just right after
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey aspired to take after Europe
since it perceived it as the most suitable political and economic model.
Accordingly, After the split with the Arab Countries, Turkey turned into a
secular and democratic country unlike the Arab states who remained Islamic and
non-democratic[i](Bauer,
2012) and by that the Arab states represented the alter ego of it as they were
what Turkey was not what it wants to be. This has led to many twists between Turkey and Arab relations that were
characterized by mutual distrust. While the Arab regimes were being toppled
down one after another in the recent years, Turkey found itself vacillating
between either protecting its interests way or helping scaffold the increasing need of democracy promotion in
these countries that share with it cultural, historical, and geographical
commonalities. Certainly, every choice has its trade-offs that will inevitably
affect Turkey in the internal or external scope. A central claim in this
context is that although these ties that bind Turkey with the Arab world, these
relations cannot be seen and looked at from a simplistic approach due to the
overlapping dimensions and the different perspectives the status quo it keeps
gaining especially with the crazed Arab Spring aftermaths. The main theme of
this is to argue for is that recent
reengagement of Turkey in The Middle East reflects a policy of re-questing this
region that once used to be ruled by Ottoman. Within that context, is Turkey
trying to conduct an expansionist mercantilist-based campaign in The Middle
East or it is trying to reach out to this region so it can fulfill its global
mission it shares with many of The Middle East countries. We put forward that Turkey’s actions
interest-based more than they are identity-based ones.
There she goes
When the Arab Spring set off in Tunisia in 2010, Turkey mysteriously kept
silent and once the revolution in Egypt burst out. Erdogan, the then Head of
the Turkish government rushed into asking Hosni Mubarak to step down from the
regime without any hesitation as it was the case in Tunisia. The situation in Libya
was more complicated because Turkey was caught between ethics and interest
where there were at least 25,000 Turkish workers in Libya. This discrepancy in
decision-making maybe described, per se, as double standard and it has put
Turkey under the loop of many scholars. That inconsistency in conducting a
reliable approach has driven Turkey to lose some of its momentum before of the
Arab opinion for some span of time. According to TESEV, Turkey reputation in
the Levant countries has dropped from 93% to 44%.
If we look at Turkey’s core activities, it can be described to have that
mercantilist-driven approach with the exception that is blended with a
soft-power method where it tries to spread its political and economic dominion
over Middle East. This strategy was the outcome of the leadership vacuum in
the Arab-Muslim world: Egypt falling apart, Saudi Arabia being sedated, Syria being
powerless, and Iraq being already torn apart if not by war by internal ethnic
and ideological conflicts between the struggling sects.
These successive events and available data in hand were the catalysts of a
mercantilist drive of the Turkish arsenal it will be implementing so it can win
the Arab world region. This was as soft-power policy that was launched as
counter-measure against the clandestine intervention of the West and Israel in
the affairs of this region. Basically, that strategy lies in the continuous
interloping activities that overlap with those of the West, yet they would be
addressed from different perspectives as Ozhan Taha stated it: “The US and
Turkey have overlapping concerns and interests in the Middle East. However, it
would be too simplistic to expect that the two countries will adopt the same or
parallel approaches”[ii] .
The rationale behind this is that Turkey wants to seize that opportunity to
gain more recognition from the Western friends and foes as legitimate and
strategic “intermediate” key-actor between the West and the East. Added to this
quest of seeking recognition, it is important to note that Mercantilism has
some components of capitalism but this latter is mainly based on free trade
model advanced by Adam Smith in his “Wealth of Nations” book. The
agendas of modern Turkey that is led by Erdogan rhymes with the theory of
Neo-Ottomanism that seeks to get back what it had yet in a more mercantilist
way. The reason behind this is that when Turkey looks at ME it remember what it
used to be not what it wants to be. Turkey would serve as the Mother country
that extracts raw materials whether natural or human ones that are abundant in
the Middle East. This process is being eased the lack of a wise government management in Middle
East (ME) and the absence of a fully-fledged democratic system in this region without
a strong grass root bases which opens the doors to one negotiator:
Turkey. With that said, according to Joshua Muravchik (2004) the number of
Arabic countries among the 22 ones which have a freely elected government is technically
none”[iii].
Another emergence of mercantilism in Turkish relation toward ME is the way the
cycle of raw materials are taken and returned to the Arab countries in a form
of commodities that are more expensive than what it has already taken from
them. The question that we may ask here is whether the profit is shared by the
alleged mother country and the Arab countries or it is only a Turkish monopoly.
As for the elements of promulgating laws that can protect that interest, it is
likely that Turkey does not have the power to pass laws to other countries to
prevent them from creating their own policies that would bridge that gap of
management; however, it is using an alternative that compensates for that
direct involvement which is soft power. If soft power does not prove effective,
Turkey will be left but only with resorting to military intervention. In that
framework, Ahmed Davutoğlu in his
article ‘‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy’’ stated that enabling both a wise soft power
along with military power should be ‘coherent’.[iv]
In addition, it is important to cast light at the alliance of Turkey with
the West who deems it the optimal mediator or interpreter of the Middle East
and by that the Western fear of losing Turkey is a real one[v]. This
leadership hegemony is confirmed by a survey conducted by the University of
Maryland, where Turkey rated 54% as the most suitable model among Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Malaysia, and Morocco[vi].
This implies that the fleet of Justice and Development Party (abbreviated as
AKP) is playing on the chord of the common cultural identity and it is striving
to marry religion at politics. Interestingly, AKP was only founded 14 August
2002 which is relatively a new political identity compared to other parties who
have an extended experience in their agenda such as Welfare Party (RP) that held
the view that Turkey should be the leader of the Muslim world[vii]
. Added to that, while the Arab rulers are laboring to establish a modus
vivendi with their respective population in an attempt to strengthen their
autocratic patrimonialist system, the Turkish armada is seizing that
opportunity and it’s rushing into influencing the top of the government that
would be easier for it to overcome due to its autocratic nature. At the same
time, it is seeking change at the societal level through different channels
like soap operas and the heroic stances of Erdoğan in many international platforms. Along with
that, alternative diplomacy, was hinted
in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s article when he stipulates that “Turkey does have
influence in Middle Eastern affairs, and not only at the state level but also
at the societal level”[viii].
It is important to notice that Turkey did not show the same enthusiasm for all
the parts of ME and the degree of commitment to it was fluctuant according to
the region and the benefits it can offer Turkey. For instance, it remained
silent and sometimes hesitant in the wake of the Arab Spring[ix].
After a while, it did some repackaging in order to stand as the undisputed
leader in ME and it started accordingly to pave the way to spread its wings
over the demising Arab economies. Turkey’s wish to rule the ME in its broad
sense was clearly uttered in the speech of the then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu when he stated that “Turkey
would henceforth lead the movement for change in the Middle East, we will
continue to be the leader of this wave… there is a new Middle East and we will
be its owner, leader, and servant… irrespective what others say, the new
order’s leader and spokesperson will be Turkey”[x].
This clear-cut declaration has led many elites in the Arab world to perceive
Turkey as an interloper who wants to barge in every affair or as a stooge of
the West. Also, Turkey continues its trial and errors operations actions to get
the large stake of the Arab world by means of popular diplomacy and cultural
Turkish-based events such as soap opera that has revealed the schizophrenic
nature of the Arab struggle to balance both tradition and modernity. Indeed, it has succeeded to gain some heart in the
Arab world by projecting the image of the opponent who would stand up to
Israel. In doing so, the idea of the secular Turkey marketed by the Kemalist
movement started to fade away from the Arab opinion, and with this course of actions Turkey is steadily
gaining a blazing star status of being the Middle East leader and savior. This
image was mainly the result of three seminal factors : Trading Effect, the
Marketing of the Turkish democratization as “a work in progress”, and
the new strata of Turkish foreign policy[xi]. The afore-mentioned factors are seen by many
scholars as stimulating and easing the unspoken Neo-Ottoman project. The
trading system factor represents the most important element that inspires its
tactics from mercantilism. The second factor is the marketing of
democratization achievements in Turkey as: Turkish model, example, or
inspiration even though some scholars do not give Turkey that status of being a
democratic success story, but they rather consider it as partially liberalized
autocracy[xii].
However, as a transition country, the stage of democracy Turkey has reached and
the concrete outcomes it has gained has given it the shine of being a
discussable transferrable experience to the
Middle East to the extent of claiming this region that once belonged to
the Ottoman and should now be taken back under its authority. These Neo-Ottoman
views were expressed in Ahmet Davutoğlu
book entitled Strategic Depth where he proposes that the
leadership is for Ottoman[xiii]. The third factor is the change in the Turkish
foreign policy that was characterized right after the Cold War by problems with
the neighboring countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Greece and Turkey was
named as the post-cold war warrior accordingly. Turkey, by and large, is
seen as secular Muslim led by what is termed as “Muslim Democrat” who rhymes
with “Christian Democrats” in Europe. Also, it has a questionable past in
Arab-Israel conflict where under its secular leadership was the first Muslim-majority
country nation to recognize Israel in 1949, which is antonymic for most of the
Arab world opinion. This latter lessens it to be the epitomical model for the ever-changing
Middle East. This may cut down the permeability and transversality of
influencing the decision-making in the Arab world, with Syria as an example of
such relative failure of triggering change at the top level. This means that
even if the will is present in Turkey, the resources are not that sufficient
for such process.
All these above-cited facts and figures lead us to wonder about the reason
why Turkey decided to be reengaged in the Middle East again although it may not
be that Promised Land for its re-quest. With the arrival of Justice and Development Party
(AKP) to the rule the equilibrium of export and import was positive with the
Arab countries, and exchange was going up steadily as the figure shows (Figure
1). In other words, Turkey is trying to catch up what it has already lost and
it’s trying to direct the steer towards the Arab world after it has been jilted
by the European club who still considers it as a strange entity to the cultural
structure of Europe. Turkey’s AKP, offended with these continuous and invalid
refusals, decided to go with the wind of the Arab world so it can acquire more
negotiation points when bargaining with the Europeans by claiming the
understanding and possession of ME.
Figure 1: Turkey’s trade with the Arab Countries
(in million USD)[xiv]
AKP, knowing the suitability of the moment in order to raid Middle East
with diplomatic visits, started its agenda of visits to ME more than the rest
of the world. According to the Turkish Ministry of Affairs the average of
visits to the Middle East that were conducted by higher official was about 45
visits from 143, i.e.: around 31.47% and this is only from 2003 till 2011[xv].
What drove Turkey’s foreign policy to thrive and gain momentum in the eyes of
the Arab world is the Islamic clout heritage that it shares with it, in which
it eased the process of shaping the statute of Turkey as the promised savior
that would revive the old glories of the Arab empire or rather the Ottoman Empire.
The Return on Investment (ROI) of Turkey in ME
has already paid off and showed some economic fruits, yet the geographic
expansionist plans pay-off will have to
wait and will eventually appear in the long run. In that Turkish expansionism context, the Lebanese
ex-Minister Karim Pakradouni warned that the Neo-Ottoman would encourage Ankara
to rush directly into a more deepened strategy in taking over Syria if the
Syrian Regime is brought down[xvi]
The answers
to the research questions that we advanced are straightforward due the
pluri-dimensionality of this relation.
Also, while Turkey is trying to decipher Middle East, it is carefully striving to
create a zero-sum conflict between ethics and interest. We have to understand
that the world of politics is not compatible with arbitrariness nor it gives a
room or a chance for gullible decision-makers. According to that basis,
Turkey’s quest for Middle East is based on soft power mercantilist-driven
approach where it is seeking to stand out as the sole intermediate between the
West and Middle East, and by that, being the gate keeper to this region that
keeps getting worse day after second. Turkey’s claim for the Middle East to be
its own property is due to vacant leadership seat in Arab countries, and consequently,
Turkey is taking benefits from that state that was created by a sophisticated
Western vacuum machine.
[i] Bauer,
Michael and Schiller, Thomas. “The Arab Spring in 2012.” in C-A-Perspectives.
Center
for Applied Policy Research. (Munich, Germany:
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität-
München, 2012).
[ii] Ozhan,
Taha. "The Arab Spring and Turkey: The Camp David Order vs. the New Middle
East." Insight Turkey 13.4 (2011): 55-64.
[iii] Muravchik,
Joshua. "Bringing democracy to the Arab world." CURRENT HISTORY-NEW YORK THEN
PHILADELPHIA- 103 (2004):
8-10.
[iv] Davutoğlu,
Ahmet. "Turkey’s foreign policy vision: An assessment of 2007."Insight
Turkey 10.1 (2008): 77-96.
[v] Dede,
Alper Y. "The Arab uprisings: debating the Turkish model." Insight Turkey 13.2 (2011): 23-32.
[vi] Telhami,
Shibley. "What Do Egyptians Want? Key Findings from the Egyptian Public
Opinion Poll." Brookings
Institution (2012).
[vii] Öniş,
Ziya. "Globalization and party transformation: Turkey’s Justice and
Development Party in perspective." Globalizing
democracy: party politics in emerging democracies. London: Routledge (2006): 1-27.
[viii] Idem iv
[ix] Idem.
[xi] Kirişci,
Kemal. "Turkey’s ‘demonstrative effect’and the transformation of the
Middle East." Insight
Turkey 13.2 (2011): 33-55.
[xii] Brumberg,
Daniel. Democratization Versus
Liberalization in the Arab World: Dilemmas and Challenges for US Foreign Policy.
ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2005.
[xiii] Walker,
Joshua. "Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey‘s New Foreign
Policy Doctrine‖." Insight
Turkey 9.3 (2007): 25-36.
[xiv] Habibi,
Nader, and Joshua W. Walker. "What is driving Turkeys Reengagement with
the Arab World." Crown
Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University 49 (2011).
[xv] Idem.
[xvi] أ. سعيدي السعيد. "سياسة تركيا الخارجية في ظل حزب العدالة
والتنمية وانعكاساتها على العلاقات التركية-العربية." مجلة الفكر (2014):474.
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